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ABSTRACT
We examined how an Australian police union boasting more than 99 percent
density has resisted the trend of decline. The union historically eschewed
arbitration and instead used political connections to achieve goals. The
environment radically changed with a major corruption report and the intro-
duction of new managerialist techniques. The union reconfigured relation-
ships with management and government but still made use of political action
to secure instrumental gains. It has structures and practices that promote
perceptions of responsiveness. The union’s support base is built on the
foundation of a well-administered legal defense fund. Membership propensity
is also a function of the union’s general protective functions, its ability to
secure benefits, and a perception of union democracy. The implications
for understanding essential-service unionism relate to the political sensitivity
of essential services, the nature of risk facing essential-service employees,
cultural aspects of essential-service work, as well as some implications
common to all unions.
Trade unions in many countries have faced problems of declining membership
density. The problem has been particularly acute in Australia, where several
factors—structural change in the labor market, changing strategies of govern-
ments and employers, and weak union organization at the workplace level—have
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combined to drive density down by nearly half in two decades [1]. In the public
sector the increasing focus on human resource management principles in the
governance of work organization, the application of private sector managerialist
practices, and changes to legislation governing employment relations have sub-
stantially changed the way in which unions and management have interacted [2].
For many unions and in varying degrees, these changes have severely weakened
their ability to recruit and maintain a strong organizational base. In some cases
unions have adopted workplace-focused organizing approaches to reverse sharp
declines in membership or obtain membership growth in areas that have had low
density [e.g. 3, 4]. Some other unions—most notably covering certain essential
service employees in the public sector—largely avoided the membership crisis.
In Queensland, for example, unions covering police, nurses, ambulance officers,
and firefighters consistently maintain over 95 percent density and are recording
membership growth. This article is concerned primarily with police union
membership. Its findings suggest that while there are specific factors that con-
tribute to our understanding of how a police union in Australia manages to retain
a strong membership base, the conclusions offered by this article provide a
base for further comparative research into essential-service unionism in Australia
and elsewhere.
The Queensland Police Union of Employees (QPUE) has a density of over
99 percent among police employees.1 Many other Australian unions have in
the past achieved complete union coverage through union security devices such
as union preference clauses in awards or agreements and closed shops. Such
arrangements are now almost universally illegal and so the proportion of
employees covered by compulsory unionism in one form or another has fallen
from 34 percent in 1976 [1] to less than 5 percent in 1998 [1]. Yet while other
unions previously reliant on compulsion have seen their membership fall—in
some cases, plummet—many essential service unions in Australia retain high
density without any form of compulsion.
This article investigates an Australian police union2 boasting almost complete
coverage and a strong tradition of union activity. It is in three sections. First, the
article provides a context within which the union under investigation resists the
trend to declining membership. Second, we analyze the relationship between the
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1 Interview with Queensland Police Union of Employees (QPUE) official, 3 September, 1999.
At the time of writing, all police unions/associations in Australia with the exception of the Australian
Federal Police Association (AFPA) enjoy similar levels of membership. The AFPA has about a
75 percent membership level. In 1997, the Police Federation of Australia was formed. The organization
that brings together Australia’s state unions/associations represents 50,000 police officers.
2 Australia’s policing system has one federal, six state and two territory jurisdictions. All juris-
dictions have strong police union organizations.
union’s universal coverage and union strategy, particularly in the context of the
“new managerialism” in police organizations. This section also considers the
impact of strong union coverage on a police management committed to the imple-
mentation of new managerialism and the new paradigm for bargaining in the
public sector. The third section of the article considers union propensity and
analyzes the way in which the union is seen as relating to its members. We
conclude that this particular union’s support base is built on the foundation of a
well-administered legal defense fund. However, this factor alone does not account
for the union’s strong levels of membership. This is also determined by the union’s
general protective functions, its ability to secure monetary and other benefits,
and a perception by members that they have a say in how the union operates.
METHODOLOGY
We used two sources of data for this project. First, we conducted a survey
of members of the Queensland Police Union of Employees using a postal
questionnaire. A random sample of one-third of the union’s membership was
drawn from the union’s membership database. Some 2200 questionnaires were
sent out to members in July 1999. Three weeks after the initial mailing, a reminder
letter was sent. Completed questionnaires were received from 907 respondents.
The overall response rate was 41 percent excluding a few returned for wrong
address. There is a slight under-representation of the lowest rank (constable) but
otherwise the sample is highly representative. The median age of our respondents
is 35 years, very close to the median age of 34 years across the police service.3 One
in six is female (the same proportion as in the Queensland Police Service (QPS).
The regional distribution of our sample is similar to that applying across the
service. Median tenure in the police service of our sample is 11 years; while 21
percent have been with the police service for less than four years, 21 percent
have been there for more than 20 years. One in ten had worked in another police
service elsewhere. We compared some data with other, earlier Australian surveys
of union members undertaken between 1990-91 and 1996.
Second, we interviewed key personnel from the QPS Industrial Relations
Department and the QPUE. The interview with QPS representatives was done as
a focus group, whereby a series of questions was discussed to discern the ser-
vice’s strategic responses to the union. Regional representatives (executive
members) of the QPUE, the general president, and senior industrial officers
were also interviewed. Before reporting our results we provide a context for the
current research.
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3 Data provided by Queensland Police Service.
NEW MANAGERIALISM
In the past two decades new management techniques have been introduced
into the Australian public sector. Agencies have been restructured along broadly
corporate lines. A regionalization process has devolved responsibility and control,
replacing the centralization tendencies of large public organizations and ensuring
a flatter managerial structure. The move to reconstruct police organizations as
corporate entities has seen the introduction of managerial practices unfamiliar to a
workforce used to a strong hierarchical structure with established employment
systems and regulated through strict organizational rules. The introduction of new
managerialist techniques, coupled with other factors discussed below, has created
a new system of industrial relations in the QPS. This new system has placed
managerial responsibility on many senior officers and produced a more formal
employer/employee relationship between these officers and the rank and file: a
situation that has arguably led to more conflict within the workplace [2].
While public sector administrative reform had become a feature of the 1980s,
the traditional police resistance to organizational change [5] had to varying
degrees constrained change. This was particularly true of Queensland, where a
strong, influential police union with considerable support from senior officers had
consistently opposed operational and administrative reform. Its close links with a
long-standing conservative government, reliant on its police service to enforce
industrial relations and public order directives, ensured that the QPS. was
insulated from many of the tentative reforms effected elsewhere in the state. It was
not until the findings of an inquiry into criminal activity in the QPF were released
that significant administrative reform could take place.
THE FITZGERALD INQUIRY
The Fitzgerald inquiry was established in 1987, and its report in 1989 revealed
extensive corruption in Queensland’s political institutions and serious misconduct
in the QPS [6]. It recommended radical administrative and managerial change
to the QPS, in line with contemporary theories of public administration [6].
Fitzgerald’s “blueprint for reform” included an emphasis on management, disci-
pline, and supervision. Changes in recruitment practices, education and training
requirements and other standard employment practices were also recommended.
These changes, according to Fitzgerald, were necessary if the QPS was going
to transform the insular nature of the organization sustained by “unacceptable
aspects of police culture” and the “inappropriate role of the Queensland Police
Union in the decision-making processes as they affected its members” [6, p. 209].
Fitzgerald also pointed to the “code of silence” among police officers that was
perpetuated by a loyalty between senior and junior officers. The very public
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support for the report and its recommendations and a subsequent change of
government ensured that over the next three years, the Fitzgerald recommenda-
tions were implemented in full. As a result of these recommendations and in the
context of new managerialist practices, the QPUE would have to reconsider
its negotiations procedures and its whole approach to industrial relations.
Another consequence of the Fitzgerald Report was the establishment of the
Criminal Justice Commission (CJC). An independent body, one of its roles was to
oversee the investigation of all misconduct allegations made against Queensland
police, including internal breaches of conduct. Immediately following the estab-
lishment of the CJC there “was a marked increase in the number of recorded
complaints against police” [7]. This increase continued until 1994 with at least 40
percent of the allegations being substantiated by the commission. The QPS was
more likely to act on CJC recommendations to bring disciplinary charges against
officers than to do so under the previous system [7].
Following its election in 1989, the state Labor government established an
industrial relations department within the newly named Queensland Police
Service (QPS). The new department would be responsible for liaising between
management and the QPUE and establishing parameters within which negotia-
tions relating to wages, working conditions, and, increasingly, the allocation of
scarce resources, could take place. In response, the QPUE began to employ
industrial relations personnel who would have some experience in this “new”
environment. The QPUE resented the new department and resisted the restruc-
turing and organizational change processes, particularly those associated with
recruitment, training and education, and promotion criteria [2]. The level of
resistance, however, was as much a consequence of its own loss of influence as
of traditional resistance to change.
From its formation in 1916, the QPUE, with no recourse to the strike or other
industrial action, had learned the benefits of a close working relationship with the
government and the need to exploit political and economic opportunities when
they arose. Over time the union came to play a pivotal role in police administration
and exerted considerable influence over the shaping of personnel in the
organization. Without recourse to the Arbitration Court, the union achieved
significant pay increases and successfully negotiated changes in allowances,
long-service leave, appeal processes, and superannuation benefits [8, 9, 10]. In
1990, this level of influence was no longer apparent and while the QPUE
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continued to resist aspects of change,4 the level of its resistance was somewhat
constrained by the existence of the CJC.
To summarize, prior to 1990 industrial relations in the QPS were conducted
on an ad hoc basis, with the QPUE playing a pivotal role in negotiations. The
industrial relations system provided for an award system that could be varied
at will, and recourse to the Arbitration Commission was another option. Benefits
for the union and its members were often secured through government support and
often as a part of a trade-off for services rendered. Face-to-face meetings with the
minister and senior police officers were commonplace, and “outcomes” were
confirmed on a handshake. The influence the union enjoyed, however, was eroded
following the Fitzgerald investigation and subsequent recommendations.
UNION STRATEGY
How, then, does the union maintain a high level of union density, in the
context of radical changes in police administration in the post-Fitzgerald era?
What approaches does the union take in its dealings with members, and with
management, and how do these approaches in turn influence the attitudes of
members toward the union? What strategies does management adopt in relation to
the union, given its high level of density? The answers lie partly in an analysis
of the survey data, but before turning to that, we discuss the findings from our
qualitative interviews. The answers are illuminated when we locate them within
the framework suggested by Pocock [11] for understanding union power. Pocock
indicates the importance of several elements of unionism that, in the context of the
external environment, influence union power. These include a union’s organizing
and mobilizing capacity (including democracy, recruitment, and delegates);
discursive power (including internal and external communication of agendas);
external “solidarity” (including political capacity and solidarity with other
unions); structural capacity (including its financial power, membership base,
internal cohesion); and its “culture and competence” (including leadership, finan-
cial management, and human resource management). The last two of these are
largely beyond the scope of this paper, but, as we shall see, we can best under-
stand how union density is maintained by seeing how the union establishes
and maintains its power, a point we return to in the conclusion.
A key element of the union’s success is the perception of democracy. The union
is generally believed by the members and by police management to be accurately
reflecting the interests and wishes of its members. This gives it substantial
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4 In 1992, the QPUE organized a statewide protest over the new police commissioner. A subsequent
union ballot passed a no-confidence motion on the commissioner, and he was ultimately asked to
step down.
credibility in dealing with police management, and this credibility is an advantage
it is prepared to wield. For example, under current negotiation procedures for a
new enterprise bargaining agreement, the union consulted the membership about
potential changes to promotion practices. Some 93 percent of respondents asked
for specific changes to be made to the promotion system. Such numbers allow the
union to negotiate “from a position of strength and credibility,” and make it very
difficult for the service to reject a claim outright. The union’s industrial relations
team is aware of the importance of securing membership endorsement
for negotiations and subsequent decisions. Members are consulted regularly,
either as a whole or when an issue affects a certain area of the service (such as the
Water Police). Regular trips around the state by both industrial officers and
members of the union executive consolidate this consultation process. The indus-
trial team sees consultation with members and a reputation for pursuing an issue
as being useful to the union’s overall credibility with the rank and file.5
A second, perhaps more important element, is the union’s ability to use its
power to afford protection for its members. The most significant protection is
offered through the legal defense fund (LDF) administered by the QPUE and
crucial to the state’s police officers. The fund allows members to access finance
for legal advice and representation. Lawyers for the union are available to
members 24 hours a day. The overall cost to the union is considerable, with the
QPUE spending up to one million dollars a year on legal costs [12]. In the
immediate post-Fitzgerald climate, access to the LDF was considered crucial
to the state’s police officers. Even now it is still considered a key element of
QPUE membership. Police officers continue to be the subjects of allegations in
approximately 75 percent of complaints received by the CJC, and the number of
allegations that result in a charge of misconduct remains constant [13].
Third, the union secures gains through exercising power in negotiations. At
first, following the establishment of the Industrial Relations (IR) Department
within the service, there was a strained relationship between the union and the
service that hampered negotiations. Unused to dealing with the service in a
structured relationship, the union tried to bypass the IR Department, and tensions
rose. This started to change in 1993 when negotiations for the service’s first
enterprise agreement began. The relationship between the department and the
QPUE improved dramatically as clear parameters for contact and negotiations
were established.6 The first enterprise agreement negotiated between the QPS
and the QPUE reflected the new managerial commitments to productivity and
cost efficiency. There was a strong emphasis on trade-offs with shift workers, for
example, accepting a shift allowance in lieu of penalties. Subsequent
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5 Interview with members of the QPS industrial team, 23 September 1999.
6 Interview with members of the QPS industrial team, 23 September 1999.
agreements have had less emphasis on trade-offs, with the QPS securing
commitments from the QPUE to its various policies and systems in return for wage
increases. While some members feel a sense of deprivation compared to other
groups within the service, whom they feel have been better treated by the
agreements, the overall package of concessions in the past five years has been
relatively benign and seemingly outweighed by the wage increases.
Fourth, the union manages cordial relations with the QPS but does so from
a position of strength. It could only be said to acquiesce on those matters from
which the Industrial Commission precludes it from negotiating, for example, the
management development plans initiated by the QPS in 1998. The relevant
officers of the QPUE adopt a nonconfrontational approach in their dealings
with the service and have a “professional, mutual respect” for members of the
industrial relations department. Union officers see this cordial relationship as
important in the context of the union’s legal inability to take strike action.
Still, the union’s influence is not overly hamstrung by the absence of a right
to strike. On the contrary, the essential service nature of police also gives police
employment relations a sensitivity in public and political perceptions that goes
well beyond that experienced by other employees. Media stories about the police
and particularly the police union are much sought after and the union has little
difficulty in raising an issue publicly if it so desires.
Moreover, the unique position of the police in public opinion has histor-
ically given the union the capacity to achieve its goals at the political level. Its
most controversial campaign in the post-Fitzgerald era was the signing of a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the QPUE and the National
Party Opposition during a crucial 1995 state by-election. In the MOU, the Oppo-
sition agreed to consider the police union’s list of claims. The union committed
thousands of dollars to the campaign, and when the non-Labor candidate was
declared the victor, a change of government in Queensland ensued. A subsequent
inquiry into the QPUE’s campaign and involvement with political identities
found that the politicians had no case to answer. The responsibility for depart-
mental charges against serving police officers involved with the union campaign
was given to the police commissioner [14]. The officers were subsequently
exonerated.7 The union was extensively criticized for its role in the by-election,
but it did appear to deliver lasting benefits for its members.
Since then, the union has held a much lower profile politically. But it does
not mean that this level of activity is now ignored. The National Party having
lost office in the 1998 general election, the union now maintains good relations
with the incumbent Labor government, which traditionally has strong ties with
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7 Interview with Gary Wilkinson, President, Queensland Police Union of Employees, October 8,
1999.
the union movement, although the QPUE itself was deeply resented for its role
in the by-election. The leadership of the union will contact the minister when
an issue is important enough to warrant urgent attention. The political reality of
police industrial relations is that no Minister can afford to ignore the concerns
of police and of a union that has almost complete coverage of its workplace.
The ability of the union to obtain media coverage and achieve its goals at the
political level in turn influences the way in which the service negotiates with
the union’s industrial team, strengthening the hand of the union in negotiations
at the industrial level. Requests and queries are dealt with promptly, and issues
are not allowed to get out of proportion. Departmental staff are always available
to union representatives, and every effort is made to arrive at an outcome that
is agreeable for all.
UNION PROPENSITY AND ATTITUDES
AMONG POLICE
We turn now to the membership survey to consider the employee perspective.
How has the QPUE achieved high density? How much is this a function of the
LDF, and how strong would its support be without that fund? How does it relate
to its members? What are the wider implications for understanding the deter-
minants of union membership at the individual level?
First, to test how strong its support is, we include in our survey a measure
of union propensity employed in several other surveys, but with a slight variation.
Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statement: If I were totally
free to choose, I would rather be in the union than not be in it. Some 73 percent
of respondents agreed (39 percent strongly, 34 percent somewhat agreed), and
just 15 percent disagreed with this statement.
This is a higher level of union propensity than is demonstrated in other
Australian surveys of employees.8 Agree responses totaled 38 percent (fairly close
to the disagree responses) among employees in both the 1995 Australian Work-
place Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS) and the 1996 Australian Election
Survey (AES). It was 64 percent among union members in AWIRS and 63 percent
among members in the AES. One difference between the police surveys and other
surveys is that the latter have asked employees whether they would rather belong
to a union, whereas the police survey asks if they would rather belong to the union.
The impact this has on measured propensity is indeterminate, but it is difficult to
believe that it is a major factor in explaining the different results.
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8 While the police survey is a survey of members only, whereas the others are surveys of employees
generally, this is not a source of bias in the comparison, as 99 percent of police employees are
unionized.
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Table 1. Reasons for Belonging to a Union
(N = 970)
% ranked
as most
important
Total
importanta
Very
important
Fairly
important
Not very
important
Not at all
important
The insurance policy
the LDF offers
The role of the union
in negotiating wages
and working conditions
The union’s ability to
assist me in disciplinary
matters
Protection from the
possibility of unfair
treatment
I can seek advice and
guidance from them
Gives me a say in
things that affect me
Provides the means
to raise grievances
The discount services
the union offers (e.g.,
cheaper mortgages,
holidays, access to
Union Shopper, and
discounted
entertainment)
Pressure from others
to belong
Something else
53
19
15
9
1
1
1
—
—
1
96
90
95
94
78
77
73
38
16
26
78
55
72
69
36
34
29
9
5
5
18
36
24
25
42
43
44
29
11
1
2
7
3
4
14
16
19
41
29
0
1
2
1
2
7
6
7
20
52
—
Question wording: How important is each of the following factors in explaining why you
belong to the union? Which of these factors is the single most important one in explaining
why you belong to the union?
— indicates less than 0.5 percent
a
Very important plus fairly important.
Reasons for Belonging
We asked how important various factors were in explaining why members
belonged to the union, and which of these was the most important factor. By far
the most important reason for membership, cited as such by over half of members,
was the LDF offered by the union (Table 1). Two of the three other common
reasons—the union’s ability to assist me in disciplinary matters, and protection
from the possibility of unfair treatment, which between them were cited by another
24 percent of members—also saw the union as a form or protection, though
more broadly defined than just the LDF. These findings confirm the predictions
of union executive members and industrial officers in relation to the question
of why members belong to the union.
Some 19 percent of members cited a quite different function: The role of the
union in negotiating wages and working conditions, but the six other possibilities
attracted less than one percent of respondents each. Notably, the two least-
important factors were pressure from others to belong, reinforcing the absence of
implied compulsion as an explanation of high density, and the discount services
the union offers. While the LDF is a special service not offered by many unions,9
in the end it is fundamentally industrial in character, and its salience reflects the
role unions have, in part, as industrial protection for their members. Nonindustrial
services, by contrast, have very little salience in attracting members.
Does the availability of the LDF reduce the collectivist orientation among
police? Without it, would the union lose half of its members? To address this
issue, we asked members whether they would still want to be in the union if it were
not for the factor that they had previously rated as most important in their decision
to join the union. We refer to this as a measure of second-level propensity. As
shown in Table 2, 71 percent indicated they probably or definitely would still want
to be in the union. This number is almost identical to the degree of union
propensity (73%) shown earlier. Only 28 percent of members said they would
probably or definitely not belong (we call these people single-reason members),
including 20 percent who said that the LDF was the most important reason for
belonging and they would probably not belong if not for the fund. The implica-
tion is that about 80 percent of police would still belong to the union even in
the absence of the LDF, indicating again a strong level of underlying support
for the union.
Interestingly, respondents who said their main reason for belonging was the
LDF were about twice as likely to be single-reason members than were people
who gave priority to other factors, including those who had a broader conception
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9 The Queensland Teachers’ Union and the Queensland Nurses’ Union offer substantial insurance
programs for their members.
of the insurance provided by the union (e.g., by referring to protection from unfair
treatment or in disciplinary proceedings). Nonetheless, among those giving top
ranking to the LDF, the majority would still want to belong even without the fund.
Members recorded relatively high levels of instrumentality and satisfaction with
the union. Some 69 percent said they had benefitted from belonging to the union
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Table 2. Second-Level Union Propensity: Whether Members
Would Stay in the Union if Not for the Most Important Factor
By most important reason for belonging
All
members
Legal
defense
fund
Assist in
disciplinary
matters
Protect
from unfair
treatment
Negotiate
wages and
conditions
All
other
responses
(as % of members citing this reason)
Yes
Probably
Subtotal: yes and
probably
Probably not
No
Subtotal: no and
probably not
No opinion
Total
42
29
71
19
9
29
1
100
32
29
62
26
13
38
—
100
50
28
78
14
8
22
0
100
59
27
86
8
5
13
1
100
49
33
82
11
5
17
1
100
53
28
81
16
3
19
0
100
(as % of all members)
Subtotal: yes and
probably
Subtotal: no and
probably not
Total
71
29
100
32
20
53
12
3
15
8
1
9
15
3
19
3
1
4
(compared to 50 percent of current union members in an earlier, cross-industry,
survey referred to as SEMSE10), while 35 percent said it had made no difference,
and 6 percent said they had been made worse off. Attitudes toward local union
officials (union delegates) were similar to those in SEMSE— 48 percent were
satisfied with them; 13 percent were dissatisfied.11 It is common for unionists to be
more satisfied with local delegates than with union leaders [1, 15, 16], so it was
notable that police union members seemed to be relatively happy with their leaders
(compared to other unionists): 42 percent were satisfied (compared to 32 percent
in SEMSE) and 21 percent dissatisfied (35 percent in SEMSE). More unusual was
the fact that both union propensity and second-level propensity were, if anything,
slightly more strongly correlated with leadership satisfaction (r = .36 and .40,
respectively) than with local delegate satisfaction (r = .33 and .34,
respectively)—usually the local effect is much stronger (cf [1]). This reflected the
fact that the union deals with just one employer, and the consequent important role
of officials in servicewide negotiations and in operating the protective support for
members.
Determinants of Union Propensity
Despite the focus on leadership, the union was seen as maintaining better
contact with its members than many others might have been: 43 percent of police
were satisfied with how the union kept in contact with its members, and 20 percent
were dissatisfied, compared to figures of 34 percent and 33 percent, respectively,
in SEMSE for a similar question.12 We analyzed the determinants of both union
propensity and second-level propensity (see Table 3) by use of ordinary least
squares regression, with attitudes on various aspects of the union as explanatory
variables. The most important determinant of both was a measure of union
democracy—whether respondents agreed that the union gives members a say in
how the union operates. Thus, the fact that 50 percent of respondents agreed,
while just 21 percent disagreed, was a significant factor behind the strong level
of support for the union.
The second most important determinant of both measures of union propensity
was the ability of the union to secure instrumental gains, indicated by the respon-
dents’ rating of the union on a scale measuring how effective the union was in
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10The Survey of Employees in Metropolitan Sydney Establishments—see [1].
11 In SEMSE, the figures were 46 percent and 19 percent, respectively.
12 In LCS-96 some 49 percent of employees agreed that unions at your workplace do a poor job in
keeping in touch with their members; 46 percent disagreed. While we might hope that Australian
unions generally would have improved their performance since 1991, and therefore comparisons with
SEMSE might not be appropriate, there was little apparent movement in general attitudes on union
contact up to 1996.
getting good pay and other allowances for members. Here there was more division
on the union’s performance: Only 6 percent rated the union as very effective,
but 49 percent rate it as fairly effective, compared to 31 percent not very effective
and 11 percent not at all effective. This in turn reflected division on the effects
of enterprise bargaining: 44 percent agreed they were better off as a result of it,
but 32 percent disagreed.
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Table 3. Determinants of Union Propensity and Broad Propensity
(OLS Regression)
Union
propensity
(1)
Second-level
propensity
(2)
Variable details
Min Max Mean
Constant
The union gives members
a say in how the union
operates.
Effectiveness of the union
in getting good pay an
other allowances for
members.
Australian unions have
too much power.
The union protects its
members.
Effectiveness of union
in administering legal
defense fund.
R2
Adjusted R2
F
N
0.482***
(0.179)
0.303**
(0.044)
0.260**
(0.054)
–0.196**
(0.032)
0.198**
(0.049)
0.169**
(0.062)
0.32
0.31
68.03
738
0.602**
(0.142)
0.224**
(0.035)
0.282**
(0.044)
–0.137**
(0.027)
0.206**
(0.039)
0.29
0.29
82.59
799
1
1
1
1
1
5
4
5
5
4
2.12
2.48
3.03
2.35
1.76
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
** Significant at 1 percent level.
A measure of the union’s protection of its members—agreement with the
statement, the union protects its members—was also significant. Here the union
was on very strong ground: 66 percent agreed, and only 12 percent disagreed, with
this statement. Perceptions of the LDF had a separate impact on union propensity.
Some 31 percent indicated it was very effective and 51 percent said fairly
effective, in administering the LDF. But notably, the LDF was less important in
explaining union propensity than the more general perceptions of the protection
afforded by the union.13
Finally, as with other studies [1, 17-24] our regressions show union propensity
is heavily influenced by union sympathy. It is measured here by responses to the
statement, Australian unions have too much power, with which 31 percent agreed
and 29 percent disagreed. Although overseas readers may find the level of
anti-union ideology here high, there is little reason to believe police have more
anti-union ideologies than other Australian employees: In SEMSE, 46 percent of
employees agreed with this anti-union statement: in AES, 57 percent.
Members’ Perception of Strategy
What do members think of the union’s strategies in dealing with management
and its members? We asked members about their satisfaction with various aspects
of management and the union. The first thing that should be noted is the lower
regard in which police management was held. By significant margins, members
were more likely to be dissatisfied than satisfied with the way the police executive
treats its employees, police executive decision making, and how much information
you are given by management about what is going on in the service generally.
Closer to home, satisfaction with the way you are supervised was much higher,
at 59 percent, with just 22 percent dissatisfied. Each of these, we should point out,
both correlated with specific and second-level union propensity and instru-
mentality, and with both measures of union satisfaction. That is, there was a halo
effect: When members were dissatisfied with management, they took out some of
the blame on the union, and this reduced their inclination toward membership.
We also asked them about the extent to which they thought the union was doing
each of eight particular things, and the extent to which they thought it should
be doing those same things (see Table 4).
The majority of members thought the union should be doing more than
what it was doing in terms of its involvement in policy matters such as transfers
and in professional development programs. The former may reflect concern
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13 It would not make sense to use this as an explanatory variable for second-level propensity, as
for the majority of employees second-level propensity measures how people would feel in the absence
of the legal defense fund.
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about the managerialist agenda. The latter result may partly reflect frustration
at the union’s inability to influence the Management Development Program,
which was perceived to have devalued the career-building paths of some
officers but which was ruled by the Industrial Commission to be managerial
prerogative. Members also believed that the union should be more publicly
outspoken about police issues. They were probably contrasting the union’s
adoption of a high-profile role in the past with its contemporary profile. However,
according to the President of the QPUE, the union has less reason nowadays to
go public with its complaints.14
On three matters the majority of members were content with how much
the union was doing—the extent to which it was concerned with disciplinary
matters, was involved in offering discount services to members, and cooperated
with the police executive. Among people who thought the union was not doing
the right thing, there was a virtually even split between those who wanted it
to cooperate more, and those who wanted it to cooperate less, with manage-
ment. Net approval of the union’s degree of cooperation with management
did not, however, preclude most members from suggesting that it should be
more militant in negotiations with management (though this was also the issue
on which the largest number recorded don’t know on how militant the union
actually was).
On one issue there was a substantial minority of members who thought the
union should be doing less: the extent to which it was concerned with political
issues. This probably reflected an adverse reaction to the union’s MOU with the
National Party (discussed above). We did not test the political allegiance of
members of the police union. However, the overall ideology of members, which
was (as mentioned earlier) relatively pro-union, would not sit well with support
for the National Party.
The higher the dissonance between what members thought the union was
doing and what they thought it should be doing, the lower the levels of specific
and second-level union propensity. We examined the correlations linking
propensity with dissonance between perceptions and expectations on each of
the eight issues (shown in the last row of Table 4). From these data, and from the
magnitude of dissonance on the issues, it might appear that the union could
improve its attractiveness to members by better aligning with members’ expec-
tations on political involvement (by doing less) and professional involve-
ment (by doing more),15 but whether these actually would have the impact
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14Interview with Gary Wilkinson, President, Queensland Police Union of Employees, October 8,
1999.
15These factors influence specific union propensity not in their own right but through their impact on
perceptions of union democracy, protection, and effectiveness in securing better wages and benefits
implied would depend on other effects, such as on benefits gained by members
through bargaining.
CONCLUSION
In the Australian public sector generally union density has fallen from
73 percent in 1982 to 48 percent in 2001 [25]. This decrease might in part be
related to the increasing focus on human resource management principles that
emphasize the unity of an organization and the common aspirations of all, and
generally discourage the need for unions in the workplace. The application of
private sector managerialism techniques and changes in legislation governing
employment relations have increased the pressure on public sector unions in
an environment that is not conducive to job security. Yet, this decline in density
has not applied to police organizations in Australia. This has been particularly
true in Queensland.
From its formation, the QPUE adapted well to an industrial environment
that prevented it by law from striking or taking other industrial action. Unlike
many other unions, the QPUE rarely used arbitral machinery to obtain benefits
for its members. Many of its industrial gains have been achieved through
informal “negotiation” and, when possible, through the strategic exploitation
of political and economic opportunities. The influence the QPUE enjoyed
was eroded in the late 1980s by a number of factors. The findings of the
Fitzgerald Inquiry ensured that the union would no longer be in a position to
resist reform in the QPS and play a pivotal role in the administrative affairs of
the police. Its level of influence with government figures and senior officers
was also constrained by the presence of an independent body committed to
limiting that influence.
It is the move to reconstruct police organizations as corporate entities and
the accompanying introduction of new managerialist techniques, however, that
has effectively changed the ground rules of industrial relations in the QPS.
Previously conducted on an ad hoc basis, industrial relations are now formally
structured around a professional industrial relations unit within the QPS and
QPUE. Additionally, new management techniques have produced divisions
within the workplace as senior officers take on management roles. As a result,
a much more sharply defined management/employee relationship exists than
did previously. The QPUE has adapted well to this new environment and has
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for members. (When we enter the latter factors into regression, measures of dissonance become
nonsignificant in explaining propensity.) However, an index of dissonance (across all the eight issues)
has a separate impact in predicting second-level propensity in OLS regressions that include the above
union-related variables.
supplied the protective features sought by its members. It provides mechanisms
and avenues for members to voice any dissatisfaction and make suggestions
for improvements. In a politically conducive environment, the QPUE is able to
harness discontent publicly and effectively and, as our survey results suggest,
increasingly, members are feeling part of that process.
QPUE’s strong underlying support is built on the foundation of the LDF.
However, it seems unlikely that the house would crumble if this foundation were
removed. At least four-fifths of members would remain even without the fund.
The desire for union membership is also determined by other factors on which
the union performs well: its general protective functions (on which it rates highly),
its capacity to secure material gains for its members (where its net advantage
is smaller), and, perhaps most importantly, perceptions of union democracy—it is
on balance regarded as giving members a say in how it operates. Despite the
apparent importance of the LDF, these are key areas in which the union needs
to continue to perform well.
Unusual for a union with such high density, workplace union activity, while
present and important, is not fundamental to the union’s success. The union is
able to prosper with moderately strong workplace activity because the union is
able to demonstrate its responsiveness, protection, and instrumentality through
other mechanisms—the centrally run LDF, the frequent consultations with
members, and the results achieved through political connections.
In terms of Pocock’s [11] typology of union power, the union’s strengths arise
from several key capacities. One is clearly its political capacity (part of Pocock’s
external solidarity). Another is its discursive capacity, of which there are two key
elements: its ability to communicate an agenda internally to its members; and
an ability to communicate externally, to the general public, when the need arises
(for example, in advertising campaigns in support of higher pay for police). A
third area where it does reasonably well is organizing and mobilizing capacity,
not so much in terms of getting members actively involved in direct action, but in
terms of promoting perceptions of democracy among its members through its
discursive strategy, which is clearly an area of strength and a matter that bolsters
the union’s negotiating power. We can best understand how union density is
maintained by the union through observing how the union has established and
maintained its power: As a consequence of its ability to deliver, most members
feel it is worthwhile retaining their membership.
There are, of course, many aspects of this case that are unique to essential
service unionism. What are the potential lessons for understanding essential
service unionism? First, although many unions in essential services are not
permitted to, or are reluctant to, strike, they may still be strong enough to
maintain high levels of membership. This is because the political sensitivity of
essential services that leads to restrictions on industrial action also gives the
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employees a strong bargaining chip: No government is keen for the public to
be aware of disaffection in the ranks of an essential service. Unions in these
areas may be able to use this political influence, overtly or covertly, to secure
gains for their members that they would not be able to achieve through such
mechanisms in other industries. They may also be able to slow down the intro-
duction of new managerialism because of these same sensitivities. Indeed, it is
difficult to overstate the importance of this political sensitivity in explaining the
strength of essential service unions.
Second, the role of workplace culture in essential service unionism is deserving
of further research. Particularly in the pre-Fitzgerald era, the old culture of the
QPS was intimately bound with the union. Even post-Fitzgerald, the culture of
attachment appears to remain. How important are such cultures in understanding
high density in other essential services? This is a research project for another day.
Third, there is a particular form of risk for employees in essential services, and
this may also influence their attachment to unionism. Because they often deal
with matters of life and death—or at least matters of personal liberty—employees
in some essential services may be more vulnerable to personal liability than
other employees and may therefore be highly receptive to indemnity insurance.
Thus, nurses have also commonly cited indemnity insurance as a reason for
union membership [1]. Some other unions, such as those for firefighters and
ambulance officers, do not operate such schemes, yet they continue to enjoy
high density, so clearly the story goes beyond this. However, other essential
services are not subject to the same degree of scrutiny by the CJC and its
successors as are police, so the salience of legal defense is particularly impor-
tant there.
Fourth, while the QPUE has performed well in many respects, this does not
imply that it is fully secure. The converse of the likelihood that four-fifths of
members would stay if the LDF were abolished or made redundant is that one-fifth
would leave, creating a major financial problem for the union. Thus, essential
service unions have not been able to rest on their laurels: The Police Association
of New South Wales, for example, has been one of the leading unions in that
state in adopting an organizing approach to workplace unionism [26], despite
being in a similar position of strength to its Queensland counterpart. For such a
union, it makes sense to ensure the power and membership support it has achieved
is not threatened by any potential change to institutional arrangements.
Finally, factors that are key to the prosperity of unions elsewhere are also key to
the prosperity of unions in essential services. Overall perceptions of union strength
and democracy are central to union propensity among police, as they are important
to other employees. They are areas in which essential service unions, like others,
have to perform. The legal defense fund is simply the most visible of many
ways the QPUE uses to demonstrate union protection of its members. The use of
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political links is an effective way of exercising power and achieving gains.
The police union has a structure and consultative practices that enable its members
to perceive that it is responsive and democratic. It is this combination of factors
that gives the police union its strength. The same elements, albeit in different
manifestations, influence the survival and prosperity of unions generally—just
as even unions in essential services have to consider the role of organizing
approaches in maintaining their positions of strength.
ENDNOTES
1. D. Peetz, Unions in a Contrary World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.
2. J. Fleming and G. Lafferty, New Management Techniques and Restructuring for
Accountability, Policing: An International Journal of Management Strategy, 23, 2,
June, pp. 154-168, 2000.
3. J. Walsh, Building Unionism in Non-Standard Service Industries: The Case of
Homecare Organising in Australia and the United States, Paper presented at the XV
World Congress of Sociology, Brisbane, July 2002.
4. B. Ellem, The Power of Place and Scale, in I. McAndrew and A. Geare (eds.),
Celebrating Excellence: Proceedings of the 16th AIRAANZ Conference—Volume 2:
Unrefereed Papers and Abstracts, (pp. 117-126), Queenstown, New Zealand,
Association of Industrial Relations Academics of Australia and New Zealand, 2002.
5. J. H. Skolnick and D. Bayley, The New Blue Line: Police Innovation in Six American
Cities, Free Press, New York, 1986.
6. T. Fitzgerald, Report of a Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and
Associated Police Misconduct, Government Printer, Brisbane, 1989.
7. D. Brereton, and A. Ede, What has Reform Wrought? The Impact of the Fitzgerald
Inquiry on Police Integrity in Queensland, Queensland Review, 4, 2, October,
pp. 51-58, 1997.
8. J. Fleming, Shifting the Emphasis: The Impact of Police Unionism, 1915-1932, Labour
History, 68, May, pp. 98-115, 1995.
9. J. Fleming, Police Unionism and Law Reform in Queensland, Queensland Review, 4,
2, October, pp. 59-74, 1997.
10. B. Swanton, Protecting the Protectors, Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 1992.
11. B. Pocock, Union Renewal: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Union Power,
Department of Social Inquiry, University of Adelaide, South Australia, 2000.
Available online:
http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/social_inquiry_download_Union_Renewal_No._12.pdf
12. QPUE, Annual Reports, Brisbane, 1991-1999.
13. QPUE, Annual Reports, Government Printer, Brisbane, 1992-1998.
14. C. Lewis, The Criminal Justice Commission: A Political Football? Queensland
Review, 4, 2, October, pp. 1-11, 1997.
15. D. E. Guest and P. Dewe, Company or Trade Union: Which Wins Workers’
Allegiance? A Study of Commitment in the UK Electronics Industry, British Journal
of Industrial Relations, 29, 1, March, pp. 75-96, 1991.
304 / FLEMING AND PEETZ
16. T. S. Simey (ed.), The Dock Worker: An Analysis of Conditions of Employment in the
Port of Manchester, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 1956.
17. C. A. Schriesheim, Job Satisfaction, Attitudes Towards Unions and Voting in a
Union Representation Election, Journal of Applied Psychology, 68, pp. 548-552,
1978.
18. J. G. Getman, S. B. Goldberg, and J. B. Herman, Union Representation Elections:
Law and Reality, Russell Sage, New York, 1976.
19. S. Youngblood, A. De Nissi, J. Molleston, and W. Mobley, The Impact of Work
Environment, Instrumentality Beliefs, Perceived Labor Union Image, and Subjective
Norms on Union Voting Intentions, Academy of Management Journal, 27, 3,
September, pp. 576-590, 1984.
20. S. P. Deshpande and J. Fiorito, Specific and General Beliefs in Union Voting Models,
Academy of Management Journal, 32, pp. 883-897, 1989.
21. V. Christie and P. Miller, Attitudes Toward Trade Unions and Unio Membership,
Economics Letters, 30, 3, September, pp. 263-268, 1989.
22. V. Christie, Union Wage Effects and the Probability of Union Membership, Economic
Record, 68, 200, pp. 43-56, 1992.
23. S. Deery and H. De Cieri, Determinants of Trade Union Membership in Australia,
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 29, 1, March, pp. 59-73, 1991.
24. P. F. M. Grimes, “The Determinants of Trade Union Membership: Evidence from Two
Australian Surveys,” Ph.D. Thesis, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian
National University, Canberra, 1994.
25. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union
Membership, Catalogue Number 6310, 6323.0, Government Printer, Canberra, 2001.
26. M. Crosby, Union Renewal in Australia—A View from the Inside, in G. Griffin (ed.),
Trade Unions 2000: Retrospect and Prospect, (pp. 127-153), Monograph 14, National
Key Centre in Industrial Relations, Monash University, Victoria, 2000.
Direct reprint requests to:
Dr. Jenny Fleming
Fellow, RegNet
Research School of Social Sciences
Coombs Building (9)
Australian National University
Canberra, ACT 0200
e-mail: jenny.fleming@anu.edu.au
NEW POLICE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS / 305
